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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH.
Plaintiff Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20070368-CA

JESSE VALDEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Valdez's motion to arrest judgment due to
testimony by the arresting officer that he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination? Trial courts have discretion in determining whether to grant
motions for new trial, and this Court will not reverse the trial court absent a clear abuse of
that discretion. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998). "However, 'legal
determinations made by the [district] court as a basis for its denial of a new trial motion
are reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Mitchell, 2007 UT App 216, ^ 6, 163 P.3d 737
(quoting State v. Loose, 2000 UT 1 \,% 8, 994 P.2d 1237).
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In this case, however, there was no contemporaneous objection made to the
testimony. Accordingly, this issue should also be reviewed for plain error and ineffective
assistance of counsel. To prevail on a claim of plain error Valdez must establish that an
obvious and harmful error occurred. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994)
(citing State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). See also, State v. Reyes, 861
P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993). Alternatively, to establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel Valdez must demonstrate that counsel's performance was
deficient—that it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment;
and that it was prejudicial—affected the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000
UT 76, U 19, 12 P.3d 92 (citations omitted).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in the time of War or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Rule 23, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted
do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good
cause for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a
judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a
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commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or ma\ enter am other order
as maj be just and proper under the circumstances.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Jesse Valdez appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth
District Court after he was convicted by a jury of theft, a third degree felony.
Specifically, he appeals from the denial of his motion to arrest judgment.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Jesse Valdez was charged by criminal information filed in Fourth District Court on
May 26, 2005 with theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 766-404 (R. 1). He waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R. 29).
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Lynn W. Davis on July 27, 2006 (R.
88-87, 109). During its deliberation, the jury submitted the following question: ctWe
would like to know if there was a checkout counter in the 'outlet?'" (R. 77). The trial
court responded: "The jury must rely upon the evidence as presented at trial" (R. 78).
After deliberating for approximately ninety minutes, the jury returned with a verdict of
guilty (R. 79, 87, 109: 63-65).
Valdez filed a motion to arrest judgment on September 20, 2006 (R. 103-94).
After oral argument, Judge Davis denied the motion by written memorandum decision
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issued on March 14. 2007 (R. 144-33). The formal order was signed on March 29, 2007
(R. 150-49).
On April 5. 2007 Valdez was sentenced to 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. The
prison sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for 36-months, and he
was ordered to pa> a $450.00 fine and spend 365 days at the Utah County Jail in the
ankle monitoring program (R. 159-57, 165: 17).
Valdez filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court on May 2, 2007 (R. 181).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Joseph Otte1 is a Provo City police officer who works part time at Deseret
Industries (DI) in plain clothes as a loss prevention officer (R. 109: 13). He has been
employed as a police officer for four years, and has worked at DI for three years (R. 109:
13). On May 19, 2005 he was working at DI (Id.). While he was walking through the
store looking for suspicious activity, he had contact with Jesse Valdez (R. 109: 15, 13).
Valdez approached him in the store and asked to borrow his personal cellular phone (R.
109: 14). Otte could not remember if Valdez informed him who he wanted to call (R.
109: 27).
Otte next saw Valdez as he was "going through an end cap which held jewelry"
(R. 109: 15). The end cap had four shelves and the jewelry was packaged in small plastic
bags (R. 109: 15). The standard price for such jewelry was $1.00 a piece (R. 109: 29-30).

1

The transcript refers to Otte as "Joseph Audy." However, the trial court, defense and
prosecution all refer to him as "Joseph Otte" so that is what will be used.
4

Valdez selected approximate!) 20 pieces of jewelry (R. 109: 16) Then he walked down
an aisle where he further inspected the jeweln (Id.). He kept some in his right hand and
put the rest back on a shelf (R. 109: 16). Valdez looked through more jeweln but didn't
select any other items (R. 109: 16). He also removed a pair of sunglasses from his rear
pants pocket and picked up a bottle of Pepsi from a shelf with his left hand before
moving to the book area (R. 109: 17). Otte followed him (Id.). Otte lost sight of him for
about five seconds and when he saw him again, his right hand was now open and the
jewelry was missing, and he was still holding the Pepsi in his left hand (R 109: 17). Otte
inspected the book aisle but couldn't locate the jewelry, so he believed Valdez had
concealed it on his person (R. 109: 17). Otte also felt Valdez was "getting nervous and
seemed to be noticing [his] presence" (R. 109: 17).
Otte went to the far end of the store and observed Valdez from a distance (R. 109:
17-18). Valdez went up and down several aisles, picked up a cart, and put some items in
the cart (R. 109: 18). He was in the store for approximately 2.5 hours (R. 109: 18). Otte
does not remember Valdez going to the front and using a telephone during this time but
"it's possible he could have used the phone up there. It's possible he could have
borrowed a cell phone from another person in the store as well" (R. 109: 32-33).
Eventually he went to the front of the store, spoke with the door greeter, and then
left the cart in the store (R. 109: 18). He went out the front door and passed all points of
sale without attempting to pay for any items (R. 109: 18). He then walked westbound
across the storefront towards Columbia Lane (R. 109: 18). Otte admitted that Valdez was
headed in the direction of the outlet part of the DI, but testified that Valdez never told
5

him he was going to the outlet (R. 109: 19, 37). At the time of the incident, there was no
interior connection between the main store and the outlet (R. 109: 36).
Otte stopped him and identified himself (R. 109: 18). Valdez admitted to taking
the items and Otte took him back to the security room at DI (R 109: 18). In the office,
Otte had Valdez empty his pockets; and from his right pants pocket he pulled out the
pieces of jewelry, and a cell phone and spell checker with DI price tags were in his left
pocket (R. 109:20).
At this point the following exchange between the prosecutor and Otte took place:
SANT:

Did you have a conversation with the defendant at this point?

OTTE:

I did have some conversation. I did read him his Miranda rights,

which he under—he said he understood and agreed to speak with me. He did say that he
was—he did contact a brother that was en route to Deseret Industries to speak with him
about some of the items that he had left in the cart.
When I—I asked him about those items. He said that his conversation with
the door greeter was that he informed the door greeter that the items in the cart were his
and that he was going to come back for them, and so he left the cart next to the cash
register which is—well, so that nobody would purchase them.
I asked him if he told the doorman about the items in his pockets, at which
time he stated he pled the Fifth and didn't want to answer the question
(R. 109: 21).
Otte then followed standard protocol for retail theft cases, and called another
officer to have Valdez transported and booked into the jail (R. 109: 21). The jewelry, cell
6

phone, and spell checker were photographed for evidentiary purposes and released back
ioDl(R. 100:21).
On cross-examination Otte indicated he had infonned Valdez he was under arrest
for retail theft and had asked him if he was trying to steal the jewelr} b\ putting it in his
pocket (R. 109: 30-31). Otte testified that in response Valdez Uwsaid that he had called his
brother. He didn't give me a real direct yes or no" (R. 109: 31). Otte also had the
following exchange with defense counsel:
GALE:

Your conversation with [Valdez] was fairly brief, wasn't it?

OTTE:

It was.

GALE:

And that was because at some point he told you that he could see

that you were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't want to talk
anymore?
OTTE:

That is correct

(R. 109: 37-38).
Valdez asked Otte to go outside and look for his brother, Blake (R. 109: 38). Otte
located his brother, infonned him Jesse was being arrested, and asked him to take care of
Jesse's bike so that it wouldn't get stolen or damaged (R. 109: 38-39). Blake informed
Otte that he was there to look at some items and that Jesse had called him (R. 109: 3940).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Valdez asseits that the trial couit committed plain erroi in allowing the arresting officer
to testifv concerning his post- Mu anda silence The error was ob\ IOUS and not harmless be\ ond
a reasonable doubt, and the conviction in this case should be re\ersed and the judgment arrested
Alternateely, he asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel at
trial
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN
ALLOWING TESTIMONY FROM THE ARRESTING OFFICER
CONCERNING VALDEZ5 S FOST-MIRANDA SILENCE.
ALTERNATIVELY, VALDEZ WAS DENIED COMPETENT TRIAL
COUNSEL.

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides upon motion of the
defendant filed before imposition of sentence, a trial court shall arrest judgment "if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the defendant is mentally
ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment." Valdez filed a timely motion
to arrest alleging that the testimony of the arresting officer that he had invoked his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination constitutes good cause under Rule 23
which requires arrest of judgment in this matter. Ordinarily, this issue is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard, with any legal determinations reviewed for correctness.
See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66 (Utah 1998), and State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11,
f 8, 994 P.2d 1237.
There was no contemporaneous objection to the testimony. However, this Court
should still review this issue for plain error, and alternatively for ineffective assistance of
8

counsel To prevail on a claim of plain error Valdez must establish that an obvious and
harmful error occurred. State v Menzies. 889 P.2d 393. 403 (Utah 1994) (citing State v.
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201. 1208 (Utah 1993)). See also. State v Reyes.. 861 P.2d 1055, 1057
(Utah App 1993). Alternative!}. to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
Valdez must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient—that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment: and that it was prejudicial—
affected the outcome of the case. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^j 19, 12 P.3d 92
(citations omitted).
A. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error which Necessitates Arrest of Judgment
in this Matter
Valdez asserts that the trial court committed plain error in allowing testimony
from the arresting officer concerning Valdez's post-Miranda silence because it violated
his constitutional right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. To establish plain error. Valdez must
show: (1) an error exists; (2) which should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3)
the error was harmful or there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result
absent the error. State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1997). See also, State
v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997). In addition, because the error arises
out of an alleged constitutional violation, the State has the burden of demonstrating that
the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d at
1296, 1298 (harmless beyond reasonable doubt standard utilized under plain error
standard of review). See also, State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269 n.4; Greer v. Miller, 483
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U.S. 756. 765-67, 107 S.Ct. 3102. 3108-09, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987); and Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630. 113 S.Ct. 1710. 1717, 123 L.Ed.2d353 (1993) {Doyle
violations are subject to harmless beyond reasonable doubt standard).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the prosecution from using a defendant's post-Miranda
silence for impeachment purposes. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617-20, 96 S.Ct. 2240,
2244-45, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Such use of a defendant's silence is a prejudicial attempt
to create an improper inference of guilt in the jury's mind. See United States v. Newman,
943 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991), and State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534 (Utah App.
1997). "'Similarly, the prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda silence as
substantive evidence of guilt." Byrd, 937 P.2d at 534 (citations omitted). "In evaluating
whether the disclosure of a defendant's exercise of Miranda rights is a Doyle violation, a
court must look at the particular use to which the disclosure is put, and the context of the
disclosure." Statev.Maas, 1999 UT App 325,^21, 991 P.2d 1108.
The trial court's ruling, a copy of which is included in the Addenda, suggests that
there was no error—obvious or otherwise—in this case because the holding of Doyle
only applies to situations where a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent is used
for impeachment purposes (R. 137). See also, Greer, 483 U.S. at 763, 107 S.Ct. at 3107.
More specifically the trial court suggested that there is no violation here where "an
officer merely testifies about 'the circumstances of the arrest and... the information
elicited was but a part of the natural sequence of events.' State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326,
1328 (Utah 1980)" (R. 137). Valdez asserts that this analysis is erroneous.
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The factual scenario in Unas is distincth eh different than is present here. The
questioning in Unas was general and dealt onh with the circumstances of the arrest: "Q.
After \ ou read him the statement of his rights, did \ ou ask if he understood them? A.
Yes, Sir. Q. And what was his answer? A. He exercised his rights and wanted to
contact an attorne} before he made am statement. Q. Did he thereafter discuss this
matter with you at that time? A. No. Sir. I called his attorne}.'* 609 P.2d at 1328. The
trial court, sua sponte. struck "I called his attorney" and instructed the jur\ it was to be
disregarded. Id. There was nothing in the testimom which could "cast any inference of
guilt" or "persuade the jury to do so." Id
Similarly, the trial court's reliance on State v Harmon. 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998),
and State v. Maas. 1999 UT App 325. 991 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1999), is also misplaced. In
Harmon, "defendant's invocation of rights was disclosed incidentally in testimony as
defendant read a portion of an officer's report intended to refresh [his] recollection of
events." Maas, 1999 UT 325 at ^ 22 (citing Harmon, 956 P.2d at 266). Defense counsel
objected but refused the offered curative instruction. Harmon, 956 P.2d at 267. In
concluding there was no Doyle violation, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the
disclosure was inadvertent and didn't cast an inference as to defendant's guilt. Harmon,
956 P.2d at 269.
In Maas, the testimony by the officer at issue was as follows: Q. "What was the
nature of your conversation with Ms. Maas?" A. ".... I explained to Ms. Maas all the
evidence I had acquired up to that time. At that time I advised Karen of her rights, read
her a waiver, asked her if she wanted to talk to me. She responded 'Why, you have
11

everything anywa\ ? No, I don't v ant to talk to you/'" 1999 UT App 325 at n. 1. This
Court concluded that the testimony was inadvertent and "not significant enough on its
own to violate Doyle T 1999 UT App 325 at ^ 24. In addition, there was "no attempt to
cast the forbidden inference that Maas's silence equaled guilt. Id. at ^j 25. "When an
officer simpl)/ testifies about the circumstances surrounding an interview, a part of which
is defendant's silence, without using defendant's silence to impeach her credibility, there
is no violation of the Doyle principle." Id
In this case—unlike Unas, Harmon, and Maas, the nature of Otte's testimony
itself casts forbidden inferences on Valdez's guilt. The pertinent exchange between the
prosecutor and Otte is as follows:
Q.:

Did you have a conversation with the defendant at this point?

A.:

I did have some conversation. I did read him his Miranda rights, which he

under—he said he understood and agreed to speak with me. He did say that he was—he
did contact a brother that was en route to Deseret Industries to speak with him about
some of the items that he had left in the cart.
When I—I asked him about those items. He said that his conversation with
the door greeter was that he informed the door greeter that the items in the cart were his
and that he was going to come back for them, and so he left the cart next to the cash
register which is—well, so that nobody would purchase them.
I asked him if he told the doorman about the items in his pockets, at which
time he stated he pled the Fifth and didn't want to answer the question
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(R. 109: 21). The vers nature of this dialogue—that Valdez was cooperative and had an
explanation ior items he^d left in a cart, hut that he \\ ouldn't talk about the items in his
pocket instead pleading "the Fifth"—uses his silence to impeach his credibility and
creates an inference of guilt. Accordingly, Valdez asserts that the constitutional
protections afforded him b\ the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and Doyle were
violated by the testimony, and any suggestion by the trial court to the contrary is in error.
In State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah App. 1993), this Court based on prior Utah
appellate decisions and Doyle, concluded that it was obvious error for the trial court to
allovs the State to elicit testimony concerning a defendant's post-custody silence. 861
P.2d at 1057, n. 2. See also, State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296. In Reyes, one of the
participating officers testified that after the defendant was taken into custody, he was
advised of his Miranda rights. He was also asked to waive those rights and speak to
officers without the presence of an attorney. The Officer then testified that the defendant
"stated he wanted to have his attorney present to talk to us." No objection to the
testimony was made by trial counsel, and this Court utilized the plain error standard of
review. 861 P.2d at 1056-57.
In Morrison, the arresting officer testified that the defendant seemed willing to
speak with him after Miranda warnings were administered until a co-defendant twice told
him to shut up. 937 P.2d at 1295. The prosecutor also questioned the co-defendant, who
testified that at the time she had her lawyer on the telephone and he advised her to remain
silent and for the defendant to do the same. So she told the defendant to shut up. 936
P.2d at 1296. Again there were no objections to the questioning by defense counsel and
13

the case was argued under the plain error standard. 937 P.2d at 1295, 1296. In relation to
the first two prongs of that standard this Court, citing to Doyle and Reyes, held, "It is
error of a nature of that should be obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor \ iolates
the well-established general rule prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a
defendant's post-Miranda silence." 937 P.2d at 1296. Valdez asserts that under Reyes
and Morrison, the first two prongs for establishing plain error have therefore been
satisfied.
In regards to the third prong—whether the State's reference to Valdez's post-arrest
silence prejudiced him, the utState bears the burden of demonstrating that the improperly
elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1296
(citation omitted). "'In evaluating whether an evidentiary issue was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, [this Court] focus[es] on 'whether there is a reasonable probability that
the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction/" Id. (quoting
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). In
analyzing such prejudice, this Court has utilized the following four factors from Reyes:
"'(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as
referring to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and (4) whether the trial court
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's [silence].'"
State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 535 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057).
See also, State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 554-55 (Utah 1987). Valdez asserts that after
balancing these factors this Court should conclude like it did in Reyes and Morrison, that
14

the elicited testimony which direct!} referenced his constitutional!} guaranteed right to
remain silent, constituted plain constitutional erroi thai is not harmless be\ond a
reasonable doubt.
The first factor is "whether the jun \^ould "naiuralh and necessarih construe* the
comment as referring to defendant's silence.'* Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. The trial court
and the State concede thattaW[t]hereis little question that with regard to the first factor, the
jury in this case 'would naturally and necessarily construe* the comment as referring to
the defendant's silence" (R. 117, 136).
The second factor is wCwhether there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's
guilt." Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. The trial court concluded that the evidence against
Valdez was "overwhelming'*: fc'[B]y the time the defendant walked past the cash
registers, he had already committed theft. No reasonable person puts a cell phone in a
leather case, a spell checker and assorted jewelry in a separate pant's pocket prior to
purchase and then leaves a store without any payment or attempted payment for any
items" (R. 135).
Valdez asserts, however, that the trial court's conclusion is overly simplistic and
does not take into account several other important factors which the jury was privy to, or
which this Court has relied upon in other cases. For example, in Reyes, one factor which
this Court found that weighed in favor of reversal was that testimony that the defendant
refused to talk with police could be seen as inconsistent with his defense theory that the
evidence was planted to frame him. Id Valdez asserts that factor is also present here.
His invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent—his refusal to talk with
15

Officer Otte about the items in his pocket—is inconsistent with his theory of the case that
he was going from the main part of the store to the outlet to continue shopping while
waiting for his brother, and that he had not left the store property nor had he moved
towards his bicycle.
While it is true that the items were located in his pockets, Valdez's theory of the
case was that he had items in his hands and was using his pockets to secure and hold the
items in question while he continued to shop while waiting for his brother. Interestingly
enough, the jury submitted a question to the trial court, which read: "We would like to
know if there was a checkout counter in the 'outlet?'" (R. 77). Valdez asserts that
question demonstrates they were strongly considering his theory of the case and that
evidence of his guilt was not nearly as overwhelming as the trial court concluded,
particularly in light of the fact that at the time of the incident there was no inside access
between the main part of the store and the outlet, and that Valdez's brother did arrive and
corroborate his story. See Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297-98 (Defendant found in same
room as contraband and claimed that items were under control of co-defendant.
Exculpatory explanation was plausible and case turned on defendant's credibility,
accordingly appellate court was "not convinced" that evidence of guilt was
overwhelming).
The third factor is "whether the reference was isolated." Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057.
The trial court concluded that "it is difficult to imagine a more isolated reference than one
solitary comment by the officer as part of a long narration" (R. 135). Again Valdez
asserts that the trial court's conclusion does not give adequate consideration to
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circumstances and e\ents surrounding the testimon}. For example, inquiries into a
defendant's silence "lake on greater significance" in light of a trial lasting onh one da\.
Velarde v. Shulsen 757 F.2d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1985). relied on b\ this Court in Byr±
937 P.2d at 536. In this case, the presentation of evidence took onh two hours and
Officer Otte was the onl} witness. Under these circumstances. Yaldez asserts that like in
Byrd. "Both the short length of the trial and the timing of the prosecutor's references tend
to weigh against the State on this factor." 937 P.2d at 536-37. Similarly in Morrison,
this Court concluded that two references during two witnesses testimonies were not
isolated in "the course of a trial which lasted only one and one-half days." 937 P.2d at
1297.
Moreover, in Reyes, this Court seemingly linked the third and fourth factors
together in its balancing: uAlthough the elicited comment was isolated and was not
referred to in closing argument, the trial court did not immediately admonish the jury to
disregard it. Instead, the trial court's curative efforts were limited to a jury instruction
given at the close of trial." 861 P.2d at 1057. The fourth factor is ''whether the trial court
instructed the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's [silence].'9
Byrd, 937 P.2d at 535. In this case, like Reyes and Morrison, there was no curative
instruction given to the jury regarding the improper testimony or defendant's right to
remain silent. Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057; Morrison, 937 P.2d at 1297. In addition, like
Reyes, the trial court's curative efforts here were limited to an instruction given to the
jury at the close of trial, which went solely to defendant's decision not to testify and did
not include his right to remain silent during pre-trial investigation. 861 P.2d at 1057. See
17

Jun Instruction 18 in the Addenda. Accordingly. Valdez asserts that the fourth factor
likewise leads this Court to a conclusion that the testimony as to his invocation of his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The trial court's ruling suggests that the invited error doctrine might or should
have application here because on cross-examination—after Otte's testimony that Valdez
had "pled the Fifth"—defense counsel had the following exchange with Officer Otte:
Q.:

Your conversation with [Valdez] was fairly brief, wasn't it?

A.:

It was.

Q:

And that was because at some point he told you that he could see that you

were—suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't want to talk
anymore?
A.:

That is correct

(R. 109: 37-38). However, Valdez asserts that the invited error doctrine is not applicable
here. One, because Otte's original testimony alone constituted a Doyle violation that was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and Valdez nor his counsel had nothing to do
with the elicitation of that testimony. Two, because the trial court still made no attempt
to cure either Otte's original statement or defense counsel's exchange with Otte on crossexamination.
The invited error doctrine provides that "on appeal, a party cannot take advantage
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Two
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principal purposes are sened b\ this doctrine: One. it fortifies "long-established policy
thai the trial court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." Id.
(citations omitted). Two, "it discourages parties from intentional!} misleading the trial
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." Id State v Argue lies,
2003 UT L ^j 56 n. 13. 63 P.3d 731 (failure of trial counsel to object to adequacy of
evaluations at competency hearing not treated as invited error but reviewed under plain
error doctrine). There was nothing in Valdez* s acts that could have misled the trial court
at the time Otte first testified as to his post-Miranda choice to remain silent. Second, if
the error is invited here it similarly would have been invited in both Reyes and Morrison
where there were no objections to the challenged testimony by defendant.
Accordingly, Valdez requests that this Court conclude that a Doyle violation did,
in fact, occur during trial, that it constituted obvious error on the part of the trial court,
and that it was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Trial Counsel was Ineffective in Failing to Object to the Testimony and in
Further Exacerbating the Error
Alternatively, Valdez asserts that his counsel at trial was ineffective in failing to
object to the testimony concerning his post-Miranda silence. Valdez must demonstrate
that counsel's performance was deficient—that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and that it was prejudicial—affected the outcome of
the case. Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at % 19 (citations omitted).
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Because the error in allowing the testimony should have been ob\ ious to the trial
court under Doyle, Reyes and other Utah and federal cases, it similar!) should ha\ e been
obvious to trial counsel. Yet no objection was made nor was there am request for a
curative instruction. Trial counsel acknowledged his "mistake" during oral arguments on
the motion to arrest judgment (R. 166 at 2). Valdez asserts that it is clear from his
statements that at the time of trial, he simply was unaware or had forgot about the
prohibition against using a defendant's post-Miranda decision to remain silent for
impeachment purposes. Accordingly, Valdez asserts that the first prong for establishing
ineffective assistance of counsel has been satisfied.
Valdez similarly asserts that because the error was harmful under a plain error
standard in regards to the trial court, trial counsel's failure deficient performance in this
regard similarly prejudiced him.
Moreover, if this Court were to conclude that the invited error doctrine is
applicable here, Valdez asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in leading the trial court
into error. "If counsel's failure in leading the court into error falls below the standard of
reasonable professional practice, we may find that counsel was ineffective." Dunn, 850
P.2d at 1220 (citations omitted). Trial counsel—like the prosecution and the trial
court—should have known that it was a constitutional violation to allow or elicit
testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes or to create
an inference of guilt. If trial counsel's exchange with Officer Otte leads this Court to
conclude that there was no reversible error due to counsel's invited error, or failure by
counsel to object to the original testimony or to request any curative instruction, Valdez
20

asserts that counsel was ineffecth e and that he was prejudiced b\ the deficient
performance. Counsel himself acknowledged he made a "mistake" in regards to the
underh ing testimon) at issue here, and in failing to object or request a curative
instruction. It is clean therefore, that there was no trial strateg} at pla\ here, rather there
was simph a deficiency.
Accordingly. Valdez alternatively asserts that trial court was ineffective in regards
to his privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
and Dovle, and that as established above he was prejudiced as a result.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Valdez requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this case to the
Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April, 2008.
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Margaret P/Gndsay
Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

,

Y

MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
Case No. 051402096

V o.

JESSE VALDEZ,
Defendant.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant, Jesse Valdez, through counsel, Richard Gale, and pursuant to Rule 23
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and based upon the accompanying
Memorandum and Affidavit, hereby moves the Court for an Order arresting judgment and
granting a new trial.
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the
defendant is mentally ill, of there is other good cause for the arrest of
judgment. Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of
acquittal of the offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a
commitment until the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter
any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances.

Defendant hereby asserts that there is good cause for Judgment to be arrested
because error was committed at defendant's trial. This error deprived defendant of his
right to due process of law, right to trial by an impartial jury, and right to remain silent in
-

-
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.•
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violation of the Fifth and Sixth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article
1 sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On July 26, 2006, a jury trial was conducted in which the jury was asked to
determine whether Jesse Valdez was guilty of Retail Theft with prior convictions, a third
degree felony. The witnesses testified to the following facts at trial:
1.

Officer Joseph Otte (Otte) of the Provo Police Department testified that On May

19, 2005, he was working privately as a loss prevention officer for Deseret Industries (DI)
in Provo, Utah. While working he observed the defendant, Jesse Valdez (Valdez) acting
in what Otte termed as a ^suspicious" manner.
2.

Otte continued to observe Valdez for approximately two and one-half hours as

Valdez shopped in the store. At one point he saw Valdez holding a handful of $1.00
jewelry items. After losing sight of Valdez for a short period of time, Otte noticed that
Valdez was no longer holding the items in his hand. Otte could not locate the items
Valdez had been holding in the store and suspected that Valdez had hidden the items on
his person.
3.

The Deseret Industries building was composed of two sections, to the east the main

store and to the west the outlet store. Between the two sections of the store was an
employee only section which could not be accessed by the public. Each section of the
store had to be entered from the exterior of the building.
4.

After Otte watched Valdez for some time, he observed Valdez approach the front

of the store pushing a cart that held some remote control cars. Valdez had a brief

Ouu

com eisation w ith the DI gieetei left the cart neai the front of the store b\ the cashieis
and exited the stoie without paying foi am items
5

Otte testified that upon exiting the building Valdez headed w est in the general

direction of the outlet store Valdez "s bicycle \\ as left at the bicycle rack w Inch w as to
the east near the enhance to the mam stoie
6.

Otte testified that he stopped Valdez appioximatel} 15 feet from the entrance to

the outlet store After stopping Valdez. Otte informed Valdez that he was a loss
prevention officer and that he was stopping him because he believed Valdez had
concealed some jewelry on his person
7

Valdez admitted to having the jewelry in his pocket and followed Otte back to the

mam store.
8.

In the secunty room, Otte questioned Valdez When Otte asked Valdez why he

had left the store without paying for the items, Valdez stated that he had called his bi other
so they could look at some items that he had m his cart Otte testified that he latei went
outside and found Valdez"s brother had arrived Valdezs brother verified that Valdez had
called him so the> could look at some items and determine whethei or not they should
purchase the items Otte testified that Valdez also stated that he had informed the
doorman at DI about his intent to come back for the items in the cart. Otte asked Valdez
if he informed the doorman that he had items in his pocket, at which time Valdez stated
that he pleaded the fifth and did not want to answer the question.
9.

Otte then read Valdez his Miranda rights and asked him to fill out a written

statement. Valdez stated he did not want to fill out a written statement.

DUuxuI

10.

At trial, when questioned by the State on direct examination, Otte testified in front

of the jury that Valdez plead the fifth when he asked Valdez if he told the greeter about
the items in his pocket. Valdez's attorney did not object. No curative instruction or jury
instruction was given to remedy the error.
11.

On July 26, 2006, the jury found Valdez guilty of Retail Theft with prior

convictions, a third degree felony.
12.

Following the Jury trial, Jennifer Ranson, a law student working with defendant's

attorney, spoke with one of jurors about their reason for convicting Valdez. The juror
stated that two of the jurors believed there was reasonable doubt in the case, but were
persuaded to convict Valdez because they thought if he had been innocent he would have
protested more, rather than quietly going away to jail. (Affidavit of Jennifer Ranson)
ARGUMENT
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states that u4the court may,
upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the
rights of a party."
The United States Supreme Court has held that, under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the prosecution may not use a defendant's post-Miranda
silence for impeachment purposes. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976). The
prosecution's use of post-Miranda silence "prejudices the defendant by attempting to
create an inference of guilt in the jury's mind." United States v. Newman. 943 F.2d 1155,
1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

U U u^ t J

ALLOWING OTTE TO TESTIFY THAT YALBEZ INVOKED HIS FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT WAS PLAIN ERROR
In the present case. Officer Otte's testimom that Valdez ''pleaded the fifth'"'
created an inference of guilt in the jury's mind. By eliciting the testimony from the
State's main witness that Yaldez had invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence the
defendant was prejudiced. Allowing this testimony in contravention of a wellestablished rule was plain error
A similar circumstance occurred In State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App.
1997). In Morrison police officers executed an arrest warrant on Morrison. After sendee
of the arrest warrant, officers searched the room where they had found Morrison and
uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a loaded gun. At trial, the prosecution elicited
testimony from two witnesses regarding Morrison's choice to remain silent after being
arrested and receiving his Miranda warning. Defense counsel did not object to either line
of questioning. Id. at 1295-1296.
One of the issues on appeal was whether the trial court committed plain error by
not sua sponte intervening when the prosecutor elicited testimony that improperly
referred to Morrison's choice to remain silent after being arrested and after the Miranda
warnings had been administered. LI at 1296.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "[i]t is error of a nature that should be
obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the well-established general rule
prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-Miranda silence.
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(citations omitted). Thus it was plain error for the prosecutor in this case to elicit
testimony from both [witnesses] regarding Morrison's decision to remain silent.** IdL

THE ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS BECAUSE VALDEZ WAS
PREJUDICED BT THE ERROR
In Morrison after finding that the court committed plain error, the Court of
Appeals considered whether the error was harmless. The court stated, *w[t]o establish that
this error did not prejudice defendant, the State bears the burden of demonstrating that the
improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, (citations
omitted). In evaluating whether an evidentiary error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, we focus on 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction.* (citations omitted)." Id.
The Morrison court used the following four factors established in State v. Reyes,
861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah App. 1993), in its analysis of the harm the defendant suffered:
"(1) whether the jury would 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring
to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of defendant's
guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; (4) whether the trial court instructed the jury
not to draw any adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify." Id. at
1297.
The facts of the present case are similar to the facts in Morrison. Valdez invoked
his constitutional Fifth Amendment rights at the time he was detained and taken into
custody by Otte at Deseret Industries. At trial the prosecution questioned Otte regarding
Valdez's invoking of his constitutional right to remain silent.

no

As in Morrison, to correctly analyze the harm Valdez suffered by the prosecution's
action and the trial court's inaction, the four factors established in Reyes must be utilized.
A.

The Jury Naturally and Neccesarily Construed the Comment as
Referring to Yaldez's Silence

The first Reyes factor asks whether the jury would naturally and necessarily
construe the comment as referring to defendant's silence. There is no question that in this
case the jury would construe the testimony as referring to the defendant's silence. At
trial, the security guard testified that "Valdez stated that he pleaded the fifth and did not
want to answer the question.'' This statement clearly refers to Valdez's silence.
Further, as the attached affidavit shows, after the trial one of the jurors admitted
that knowing about Valdez's silence affected the jury's decision to find him guilty.
B. There Was Not Overwhelming Evidence of Valdez's Guilt
The second Reyes factor considers the evidence of defendant's guilt. In order to
show harm the evidence must be overwhelming. In this case, the evidence was not
overwhelming.
The testimony at trial showed the following facts:
1.

Valdez spent over two hours shopping;

2.

The items in his pocket were small and could easily have fallen through the
shopping cart;

3.

Valdez called his brother meet him at the store

4.

Valdez had not left the store property and was actually stopped close to the
entrance to the outlet store.
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5.

Valdez told Otte that he was waiting for his brother to bring him money

6.

Valdez told the DI greeter he would be back to purchase the items in the
cart

7.

Valdez left his bike near the entrance to the main store

8.

Valdez's brother actually arrived and stated that Valdez had called him to
come and look at the items to determine whether they should purchase the
items Valdez was accused of stealing.

Certainly this evidence is sufficient for the court to conclude that evidence of
Valdez's guilt was not overwhelming.
C.

The Reference to Valdez Invoking his Right to Remain Silent
was Not an Isolated Incident

The third Reyes factor is whether the reference to Valdez's invoking of his right to
remain silent was an isolated incident. In Morrison, the court held that two references to
the defendant's silence in a 1-1/2 day trial prejudiced the defendant. In the present case,
the prosecutor referred to Valdez's invocation of his right to remain silence during direct
examination of the loss prevention officer. Although there was a single reference, the
reference came from the prosecution's only witness. Furthermore, the trial was a one day
trial, the presentation of evidence lasted less than two hours. It was during this short
presentation that the reference was made. Although there were two references in
Morrison, more evidence was presented in that trial, therefore a single reference in this
short trial from the state's only witness, was not an isolated incident.
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D.

The Court Did Not Give the Jury Arn Curative Instructions

The fourth factor deals with the trial courts instructions to the jury not to draw any
adverse presumption from defendant's decision not to testify. In the present case.
Defendant's counsel did not request and curative instructions and the court did not give
an\ curative instructions sua sponte. Jury Instruction #18. instructed the jury that they
could not hold Valdez's decision not to testify against him. However, the court did not
give a curative instruction to the jury regarding their duty to not indulge in any adverse
presumption or inference because of post arrest silence.
CONCLUSION
It was error for the Otte to testify that Valdez invoked his fifth amendment right to
remain silent. Although defendant's attorney did not object, this was a plain error
because it violated the well-established rule prohibiting the state from eliciting testimony
of a defendant's invocation of his fifth amendment right to remain silent. After
considering the Reyes factors as outlined in State v. Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293 (Utah App.
1997), the state cannot show that this improperly elicited testimony was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. This constitutes good cause as contemplated by Rule 23 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, judgment should be arrested and Jesse Valdez
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should be granted a new trial.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

h

I,
day of Septembef, 2006 /
•"'

RICHARD P. GALE
Attorney for Defendant
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GENERAL 4FFID4VIT
State of Utah
Count} of Utah

BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary, Ste\ en E \\ erett, on this 1 lth day of September,
2006, personally appealed Jennifei Ranson, known to me to be a credible person and of lawful
age, who being by me fust duly sworn, on hei oath, deposes and says
On the day of Jesse Valdez's trial, I, Jennifei Ranson, was an extern with the Utah
County Public Defender office I had accompanied my supervisor, Mr Richaid Gale, to the
courthouse, m older to obsen e Mi Valdez's trial Following the verdict and the close of the
trial, I w as discussing the case w ith Mr Gale, m the courthouse parking lot As I walked to my
cai, my path crossed that of one of the jurors who had decided Mr Valdez's case The juror was
a young man, dressed m jeans and a black button-up shirt 1 gieeted him and asked him what he
thought about the expenence He responded that it was a heavy burden to have the responsibility
to make decisions that have a serious effect on anothei person's life
At that point, Mi Gale approached and asked the juroi what had convinced him of Mr
Valdez's guilt, what had made up his mind To this, the juror replied that he thought we had
made a good argument and that "there had been two of us that weie holdouts" but they had
finally been convinced when they decided that a reasonable peison would have protested for
their innocence more than our defendant did He said that rather than just pleading the Fifth, an
innocent person would not have gone quietly but would have aigued and tried to show his
innocence Mr Gale then thanked the juior for his time and service and we all went our different
ways

Jennifer Ranson
579 N 800 W, Provo UT, 84601
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 11th day of September , 2006

[signature of Notary]

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires. January 1, 2010.

STEVEN E. AVERETl
KOiwrmic-swEtivw
1665 NORTH 1650 WEST
MAPLETON, UT 84664

COMM. EXPIRES 01-01-2010

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNT\, ST4TE Of UT4H
DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

STATE OF UT\H
Plaintiff

CASE NO 051402096

vs

DATE MARCH 14 2007

JESSE > 4LDEZ,

JUDGE m\TN \\ DAVIS

Defendant

This matter came before the Court on January 25 2007 Each side w as lepresented b>
counsel and the defendant was piesent Aftei entertaining aigument, the court took the matter
under ad\isement
The Court haung carefully considered the diguments of counsel and the \anous
memoianda m the file, heieb> mles as follow s

I
Procedural Histor>

1

Defendant, Jesse Valdez, was charged in a criminal information of Theft, a third degree
felony, relating to an incident date of May 19, 2005

2

A jury trial was conducted on July 27, 2006 The defendant was present and represented
by Richard Gale, a Utah County Public Defender The State of Utah was represented by
Jason Sant, Deputy Utah County Attorney

3

The jury returned a verdict of guilty
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4

The matter was set for sentencing on Septembei 6, 2006 The defendant failed to appear
foi sentencing and a no bail warrant issued toi his an est He then appeared late and the
warrant was lecalled

5

Defendant, b> and thiough counsel filed a ''Motion to Arrest Judgment" on September
20, 2006

6

The State of Utah filed "State's Motion to Enlarge Time to Respond to Defendant's
Motion to Arrest Judgment" on October 13, 2006, and subsequently filed "State's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment" on November 29, 2006.

7

Oral Arguments were conducted on or about January 25, 2007.

II
Statement of Relevant Facts

On July 26, 2006, a jury trial was conducted m which the jury was asked to determine
whether Jesse Valdez was guilty of Retail Theft with prior convictions, a third degree felony. The
witnesses testified to the following facts at trial
1.

Officer Joseph Otte (Otte) of the Provo Police Department testified that on May 19, 2005,
he was working privately as a loss prevention officer for Deseret Industries (DI) in Provo,
Utah. While working he observed the defendant, Jesse Valdez (Valdez) acting in what
Otte termed as a "suspicious" manner.

2.

Otte continued to observe Valdez for approximately two and one-half hours as Valdez
shopped in the store. At one point he saw Valdez holding a handful of jewelry items.
After losing sight of Valdez for a short period of time, Otte noticed that Valdez was no
longer holding the items in his hand. Otte could not locate the items Valdez had been
holding in the store and suspected that Valdez had hidden the items on his person.

3.

After Otte watched Valdez for some time, he observed Valdez approach the front of the
store pushing a cart that held some items. Valdez had a brief conversation with the DI
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gieetei. left the cart neai the front of the stoie and passed b) all cashiers and exited the
stoie without paying foi, 01 attempting to pa\ foi, am items
4

Otte testified that he stopped Valdez outside of the stoie \fter stopping Valdez, Otte
informed Valdez that he was a loss prevention officei and that he w as stopping him
because he behe\ed Valdez had concealed some jew elry on his person Officei Otte
testified that "(Valdez) admitted to taking the items, and then 1 took him into the security
loom at Deseret Industries '"

5.

Officei Otte testified furthei "Once m the security office I asked him to empty the
contents of his pockets Fiom his right pant pocket he pulled out the pieces of jewelry
There were nine pieces of jewelry all together From his left pocket he pulled out a Nokia
cell phone that was in a leather case and a spell checker, both of which had Deseret
Industries price tags on them "

6.

Officer Otte read Mr Valdez his Miranda rights which he (Valdez) said he understood
and Valdez agreed to speak with Officer Otte.

7.

In the security room, Otte questioned Valdez When Otte asked Valdez why he had left
the store without paying for the items, Valdez stated that he had called his brother so they
could look at some items that he had m his cart, not on his person Otte testified that he
later went outside and found that Valdez's brother had arrived Valdez's brother verified
that Valdez had called him so they could look at some items and determine whethei or
not they should purchase the items. Otte testified that Valdez also stated that he had
informed the doorman at DI about his intent to come back for the items m the cart. Otte
asked Valdez if he informed the doorman that he had items in the pocket, at which time
Valdez stated that he pleaded the fifth and did not want to answer the question.

8.

Valdez's attorney did not object. No curative instruction was requested and no specific
jury instruction was given to remedy the alleged error.

9.

Upon cross examination, defense counsel asked a question referring to this exact
exchange.
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Q

'And that w as because at some point he told \ou that he could see that you
were - - suspected him of shoplifting and he told you he didn't w ant to talk
anymore7,'

A

"That is conect"
(Ti ansa ipt at 3 7-38 emphasis added)

10

Except as noted above, no other reference to Mnanda oi the defendant's silence was
made in eithei testimony or argument during the lemamder of the trial

11

On July 26, 2006, the jury found Valdez guilty of Retail Theft with pnor convictions, a
thud degree felony

III
Law and Analysis

Defendant, Jesse Valdez, through counsel, Richaid Gale, and pursuant to Rule 23 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Proceduie has moved the Court foi an Order arresting judgment and
granting a new trial

Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Ciimmal Procedure states

At anytime prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative
may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or if the defendant is mentally ill, or
there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon arresting judgment the
court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged is entered or
jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the defendant is charged anew or
retned, or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the
circumstances.
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The defendant asseits that there ^ good cause foi Judgment to be anested because en or
\\ as committed at defendant's trial Dctendant asseits furthei that this light to due process of law,
right to tnal b\ an impartial ju^ and right to leniain silent m \iolation of the Fifth and Sixth
amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1 sections 7, 10 and 12 of the
Constitution of Utah
The United States Supreme Court has held that under the Due Piocess Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the piosecution ma} not use a defendant's post-Miranda silence for
impeachment puqioses See Do\le v Ohio, 426 U S 610, 619 (1976) The piosecution's use of
post-Miranda silence apiejudices the defendant by attempting to create an mfeience of guilt m
the jury's mind " United States i Newman, 943 F 2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir 1991)
This Court, m the legal analysis, will rely almost exclusive!} upon the buefmg of the
State of Utah because it reaches the onl> legally sustainable lesult
First Defendant has invoked Article I sections 7, 10, and 12 of the Constitution of Utah,
yet his brief does not reference the Utah Constitution oi make any independent aiguments
Accoidmgl} the Court lejects independent state constitution grounds because of the absence of
an) briefing
Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Cnminal Pioceduie provides that m ordei foi a defendant
to pievail on a motion foi a nevv tnal, he must how an "error oi impropriety which had a
substantial adverse effect upon the lights of a party " In the instant case the defendant argues that
Officei Otte's solitary leference at trial to the defendant's post-Miranda invocation of his Fifth
Amendment nghts constitutes a violation of due process as outlined by the U S Supreme Court
in Doyle v Ohio, 426 U S 610, 619 (1976) and that this solitary reference "had a substantial
adverse effect" upon his nghts The Court notes that no pre-emptive, pre-trial motion (motion in
limine) had been filed and the Court was never alerted to the fact that there might be any
problematic testimony
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In support of his motion, the defendant relies almost exclusively on two items an
affidavit of a law cleik leporting a post trial com eisation the defendant's attorne\ had with a
juror, and the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State v Morrison, 937 P 2d 1293 (Utah App
1997)
First the Court will addiess the admission of a clerk's affidavit

Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) states

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify
as to any matter oi statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith . . .
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a
matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for
these purposes

Similarly, in a civil case, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]it is well settled that the only
evidence admissible to impeach a jury verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was
determined by chance or resulted from bnbery." Groen v Tn-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983)
(citations omitted). In fact, the Groen Court stated that because the jurors' affidavits "make no
statement that the verdict or any juror's assent to it was obtained by chance or induced by bribery
. .. [t]he affidavits were therefor inadmissible and incompetent as a basis on which to grant a
motion for a new trial. Id. (citation omitted).
And in a case which predated Evidence Rule 606 and was in part the reason for the
existence of Rule 606, State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972), the defendant asserted that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury discussed his
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failure to testify and considered that as a lactoi m arriving at its \ eidict The defendant called as a
w itness one of the juiors who testified that wtshe would not ha\ e concuiTed in the \ erdict, had the
discussion of defendant's failure to take the stand not been a significant part of the
deliberations " Gee at 663 In response, the Utah Supieme Court stated

In a long line of decisions m this jurisdiction, the principle has been firmly established
that evidence b> affidavit 01 testimony of a juroi will not be received to impeach or
question the jury verdict 01 to show the giounds upon which it was rendered, or to show
then misunderstanding of fact or law, 01 that the misunderstood the chaige of the court, or
the effect of then veidict, 01 then opinions, surmises and piocesses of reasoning in
arriving at a verdict. (Citations omitted )

And m State v Lucero, 886 P.2d 1 (Utah App 1993), the defendant submitted an affidavit of a
juroi to support his claim that one of the jury instructions improperly influenced the jury and the
jury's deliberation In response, the Court of Appeals stated "All inquiries into the thought
processes of the jurors are improper because they undermine the integrity of the verdict. . .
Because the affidavit contains information concerning the jury's deliberations, the trial court
properly refused to consider it." Id at 3 (citing State v Thomas, 830 P 2d 243, 248 n. 4 (Utah
1992)).
Based upon this analysis, together with deficiencies discussed later, the Court rejects the
law clerk's affidavit.
Next, the Court will address whether the trial court's admission of Officer Otte's
testimony constituted a due process violation.
As stated above, the defendant, in his Motion, relies almost exclusively on the Morrison
decision. The Morrison decision, in turn, cites and relies upon Doyle in holding that "[i]t is error
of a nature that should be obvious to a trial court when the prosecutor violates the wellestablished general rule prohibiting him or her from eliciting testimony of a defendant's post-

Mnanda silence " Momson, 9^7 P 2d at 1296 Howe\ei, the defendant's leliance on Momson is
misplaced m the instant case because the Utah Supieme Court has held that no Do}Ie violation
has occuned when an officei meieh testifies about 'the cncumstances of the an est and
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information elicited was but a part of the natuial sequence of e\ ents " State i hi ms, 609 P 2d
1326, 1328 (Utah 1980)
The U S Supieme Court held in Do\Ie v Ohio that the use for impeachment purposes of
a defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent \iolates the Due Piocess Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U S Constitution The Court latei explained in Gieei v Millet,
483 U S 756 (1987), that the prosecution must make some "specific inquiry or argument"
regaiding the defendant's post-Miranda silence foi a Do] k \ lolation to occur Gi eei, 483 U S at
764 The Utah courts have lepeatedly constiued Doyle and Gieei to mean that a due process
violation "involves more than simply referring to a defendant's post-Mnanda silence " State v
Maas, 99\ P 2d 1108, 1112 (Utah App \999), State v Haimon, 956 P 2d 262 (Utah 1998) The
Utah Supreme Court has held that "the mere mention that a defendant invoked his constitutional
rights does not prima facie establish a due piocess violation " State \ Hai mon, 956 P 2d 262,
268 (Utah 1998) In Hai mon, the Supreme Court refused to find a Doyle \ lolation because the
reference to the defendant's invocation of rights was elicited "merely incidentally" and the
prosecutor made no further refeience to the defendant's silence or attempt to "persuade the jury
to do so " Id at 269 In Maas, even though the arresting officer mentioned at trial that the
defendant had invoked her Mu anda rights, the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[t]he disclosure
of Maas' invocation of rights was

incidental to the description of Officer Neal's conversation

with Maas" and found no Doyle violation Maas, 991 P 2d at 112 The Maas court follows Greer
when it states "A prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a defendant's
exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a defendant's exculpatory explanation of
his conduct" Id
Harmon and Maas are controlling in the instant case Officer Otte's statement revealing
that the defendant had "pled the Fifth" came at the end of a long narration of events as he
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answeimg questions (aftei his w ai\ ei), did nothing to piotest his innocence It is not implicit that
the juror w as referring to the defendant's post-Miranda invocation silence In other w ords the
juroi could just as easity ha\e been lefenmg to the defendant's choice of pre-imocation
statements To argue that the \eidict would ha\e turned out diffeiently because of one juror's
unclear statement of one leason why he 01 she \ oted to com ict is highly questionable The ]uior
could ha\ e been refenmg to the fact that when the defendant was confionted outside the store
about having jewelry items on his peison, he did not protest, but fiankty admitted taking the
items The ambiguity of the affida\it is troubling and forms an independent basis for its rejection
The State of Utah easily satisfies the second Reyes factor, "whethei there was
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt " Id The case facts and the piosecutor's
arguments centered on the fact that b> the time the defendant walked past the cash registers, he
had already committed theft No leasonable person puts a cell phone in a leather case, a spell
checkei m a pant's pocket and assorted jewelry m a separate pant's pocket prior to purchase and
then leaves a store without any payment or attempted payment for any items Certainly, a jury
may conclude on these facts that the defendant was guilty- without any argument or refeience
whatsoever by the State that they should draw an mfeience of guilt from his silence The
evidence of guilt was overwhelming
The State also satisfies the third Reyes factor, "[w]hether the leference was isolated " It is
difficult to imagine a more isolated refeience than one solitary comment by the officer as part of
a long narration, without any subsequent argument or inquiry by the prosecution Momson, m
contrast, had two entire lines of questioning concerning the defendant's silence, with clear
indication from the prosecution as to what conclusion the jury should draw from his silence
Momson at 1295-96 In stark contrast, the reference in this case is clearly and unquestionably
isolated
The Fourth Reyes factor, "whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any
adverse presumption from the defendant's decision not to testify," Morrison at 1297, may have
been satisfied by jury instruction 18 The defendant correctly states that the instruction does not

answeied the piosecutoi s open-ended question "Did \ou ha\ e a com elation with the defendant
at this point9' Officei Otte sa\s nothing about the defendant s imocation ot lights until the
fourteenth line of his testimom, as printed in the tnal tianscnpt Neithei the piosecutoi nor
Officei Otte makes mention 01 makes e\ en a \ ague ieference to the in\ ocation of lights at am
other time dunng the tnal, eithei m examination or in aigument Theie was no * specific mquir)
01 argument" legaidmg the Defendant's silence The lefeience was only "incidental" and was
part ot Officei Otte s lecitation of the "natural sequence of e\ ents "
Cleail) this case is distinguishable fiom Moi i ison, since in that case the piosecution
focused an entire line of questioning on the defendant's "willingness to talk," using two different
officei witnesses, and asserting m argument a theory about the defendant's intention in keeping
silent, Moi i ison, 937 P 2d at 1295-96 Nothing akin to the Moi i ison scenano has occurred in this
case
Even if the tnal court's admission of Officei Otte's statement was en or, it did not ha\e a
"substantial ad\erse effect upon the lights of a part)" sufficient to oidei a new tnal
E\ en if Defendant weie conect in aiguing that the trial court ened in admitting Officei
Otte's testimony, the error was harmless The purpose of the Re\es factois are to "guide" the
court, and the State need not pie\ail on all foui factois to show harmlessness Moi i ison at 1296
Theie is little question that with regard to the fust factor, the jury in this case "would
'natuially and necessarily construe' the comment as lefernng to the defendant's silence " Id It is
certainly unclear whether "knowing about Valdez's silence affected the jury \ eidict " Assuming,
arguendo, that this Court were to admit the law clerk's affidavit, a thoiough reading of the
affidavit shows that the juror was concerned about the defendant's failure to protest his
innocence What is claimed is that the juror was concerned about the defendant's failure to
protest his innocence What is not known is if the juror's concern arose from the defendant's prewaiver statements or his post-invocation silence This is not known because the defendant had,
pnor to invoking Miranda, previously waived Miranda and willingly answered questions It is
reasonable to infer that the juror was concerned that the defendant, while he was willingly
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specifLalh icfei to 4 post an est silence ' but that is not an element that the Moi / isoi ox Re\ cs
courts ha\e lequned or e\en anahzed The Court conclude^ that it is unJeai whethei instruction
18 sufficienth mstiucts the jui\ that it should not make am piesumption 01 inference from the
defendant's silence
The Court has addressed and consideied all the Re] cs factois Ne\ ertheless it is the
opinion of this Court that the facts of this case aie exceptionally unique
The Coun notes that the Stated reference to the defendants silence v as isolated and w as
elicited b\ a genenc question The onlj specific inquiry ielating to defendant's silence was
elicited b) the defense not the piosecution (See tianscnpt at M 38) It is clear that the defense
cannot invite enoi and then rely upon that enoi on appeal 01 foi anothei remed) It is unclear
whethei the defense can enhance and mdependentl} le-emphasize the "silence en or" b} its own
cioss examination howe\ er isolated and then continue to claim ' plain en or " Once the defense
engages in cioss examination specifically lefeiencmg the silence of the defendant is the
Momson/Re\es anal)sis even applicable9 Neithei the defense noi piosecution addresses this
critical issue It has not been briefed and the Court is left to pondei Is the cuiatne mstiuction
obligation waived7 Query Was it the prosecution, defense 01 neithei that ma> have cieated an
inference of guilt in the jury's mind b> refeiencing the defendant's silence9 How can this Court
diffeientiate9

Ui!0l34

IV
Conclusion

For the reasons cited above, the Court denies the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
The State of Utah is instmcted to prepare an Order consistent with this ruling. The clerk of the
court is instructed to set this matter for sentencing forthwith.
7&

Dated this

day of March, 2007
BY THE COURT
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INSTRUCTION NO

!

8

A Defendant is not required to testify in Defendant's own behalf. The law expressly gives
a Defendant the privilege of not testifying if that Defendant so desires. The fact that a Defendant has
not taken the witness stand must not be taken as any indication of that Defendant's guilty, nor should
you indulge in any presumption or inference adverse to the Defendant by reason thereof. The burden
remains with the State, regardless of whether a Defendant testifies in Defendant's own behalf or not,
to prove by the evidence such Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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